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n Lis paper proposes a new concept of the left-side relatively 
weak first-degree stochastic dominance (L-RWFSO) order that 
extends the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) order and the 
left-side monotone likelihood ratio (L-MLR) order. We show thal 
this shift is a larger subset of FSO shifts than the MLR shift 
and the L-MLR shift that derive the same comparative statics 
results. 
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I. Introduction 
The effects of uncertainty on 밍1 individual’s choice are theoretical 
interes디ng and have significant policy implica디ons. In fact. the 
attention paid to this aspect of economic decision-mak.ing has a 
long tradition in the histOlγ of economics. Since its introduction by 
von Neunlann 밍ld Morgenstern (1 944). expected utility theorγ has 
been the dominant framework for the economic analysis of 
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uncertainty and there has been much progress in the theoretical 
and applied 밍lalysis of choice under uncertainty. 
An important compara디ve static question in the study of 
decisions under uncertainty is how to predict the direction of 
change for a choice variable selected by the decision maker when a 
given random par없neter changes. This general comparative static 
analysis is usually carried out by restricting the following 
components; (i) the changes in probability distribution function 
(PDF) or cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random 
parameter. and/or (ii) the set of decision makers. and/or (iii) the 
structure of the given economic decision model. 
In the context of a one-ris쩌r and one-safe asset portfolio problem. 
Fishbum and Porter (1 976) showed that a first-degree stochastic 
dominance (FSD) improvement in the retum of the ris싸r asset does 
not necessarily induce a risk-averse investor to increase his 
demand for the ris셰r asset. This implies that. only for the subsets 
of the set of general FSD shifts. interes디ng comparative static 
statements regarding the choice made by an arbitrary risk-averse 
decision maker can be made. That is. we restrict the set of FSD 
shifts to obtain determinate comparative statics predictions. 
Landsberger and Meilijson (1 99이 and Kim (1998) characterized 
such restrictions. Two recent papers by Landsberger and Mei피son 
(1 99이 and Kim (1 998) introduced two special types of FSD shifts. 
a monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) shift and a left-side monotone 
likelihood ratio (L-MLR) shift. respectively. The MLR order is defined 
by imposing a monotoniciψ restriction on the ratio of a pair of 
PDFs. The L-MLR order that extends the MLR order relaxes the 
monotonicity requirement for points to the right of the crossing 
point. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the larger subset of FSD 
shifts than the MLR shift and the L-MLR shift which result in the 
same compara디ve statics results. We refer to the relaxed version of 
the MLR and L-MLR restrictions as a left-side relatively weak FSD 
lmpro아vement. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II we set out the 
general economic model in which a decision-maker maximizes his 
expected utility of the outcome variable that depends on a choice 
variable and a random variable and give three definitions of 
ordering CDF’s (MLR. L-MLR. 밍ld L-RWFS미. We also illustrate a 
graphical and numerical examp1e to describe the definition of 
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L-RWFSD. Section III contaíns the comparative statics result for 
L-RWFSD orders. Finally section 1\1 provides a concluding remark 
and applications of this model. 
11. The Decision Model and J)efinitions 
We use the general decision model íntroduced by Kraus (1979) 
and Katz (1 981) in their work. The decisíon maker ís assumed Lo 
choose the optimal value for a choice variable α taking the random 
varíable x as gíven. He chooses α so as to maximíze expectεd 
utility. where u디lity u depends on a scalar valued function of the 
choice variable and the randol1l variable. z(x. α). Forl1lally. the 
economic agent's decision problem is to select α to maxil1l ize 
E[u(z(x. α))J. That is. max E[u(z(x. α))J. In this decision framework. 
a 
utility depends only on the outcome varíable z.. that is. the 
objective functíon is single dimensional. Thus. problems involvin당 
multidimensíonality are avoided. 
We also assume that utility functíon u(z) is twice differentíable 
wíth respect to its argument wíth u'(z) 르 O 뻐d u"(z) 드 O. To simpliψ 
the discussion. we follow the literature and focus on the case 
where zx(x. α) 븐 O. This assumptíon. combined with 1ι(z) 근 O. índicates 
that higher values of the random variable are preferred to lower 
values. The case where zx(x. α) 드 o can be handled with appropriale 
modifications. Note that pril1les on u(.) are used to denole 
derivatives while subscrípts with other functions denote par디al 
derivatives. 
We assume that the supports of the random variable x under F(x) 
are [x2.x~1 and under G(x) are [xl.x31 where Xl 르Xz and X.3 르 Xl. 
Landsber당er and Meil덴son (1 990) introduced the concept of a 
monotone likelihood ratio order that is defined by imposing a 
monotonicity restriction on the ratio of a pair of PDFs. 
Definition 1 
F(x) represents a monotone likelíhood ratio FSD shift from G(x) 
(denoted by F MLR G) if there exists a non-decreasing functíon 
h:[Xz.x:ll• [O.co) such that j(x)=h(xlg(xl for al1 xE{xz.x31. 
Kim (1998) íntroduced 야le concept of the L-MLR order that. for 
the left-side of a given point. imposes monotonicity restrictions on 
the likelihood ratio. The set of L-MLR shifts includes the set of 
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MLR shifts defined in 뎌ndsberger 밍ld Meil젠son (1 99이. 
Definition 2 
F(x) represents a left-side monotone likelihood ratio FSD shift from 
G(.씨 (denoted by F L-MLR G) if there exists a point mε (X2 ,X3J and a 
non-decreasing function h: [x2 ,ml• [0 , 11 such that j(x) = h(x)g(x) for all 
xε [x2 ， m) and g(x) 드η지 for all xε[m，x31. 
The L-MLR conditions require that the PDFs J and 9 cross only 
once at the point m and that g(x) 는j{x) for all points to the left-side 
of m. Since the L-MLR order requires the condition of monotone 
likelihood ratio only for the left-side of the point m , it is more 
general than the MLR order. Thus , the MLR order implies the 
L-MLR order. A L-MLR shift specifies a probabìlity transformation 
such that a decreasing proportion of probability mass of the left-
side of the point m is transferred to the π힘1t-side of the point m. 
We extend the set of admissible FSD shifts by relaxing a 
restriction on the sign of the derivative of the likelihood ratio used 
to define the L-MLR order. We call it a ‘left-side relatively weak 
FSD shift' (L-RWFSD). The L-RWFSD order is formally defined as: 
D얻finition 3 
F(x) represents a left-side relatively weak FSD shift from G(x) 
(denoted by F L-RWFSD G) if 
(a) There exists a point mε [X2 ,X3J such that flx) 르 g(x) for all xε 
[x2 ,m) and j(x) 는g(x) for all xE [m,x31 









where x* denotes the value of x sa디s1ÿing [z(x, 0'2) - z(x, αdJ=O. 
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FIGURE 1 
F L-RWFSD G. 
Condition (a) imposes 야le restriction that the 1:'\νo PDFs cro~.s 
only once at a point m. Conditions (a) 윈ld (b) imply that. for the 
left-side of the point m , 야le L-RWFSD order is less restrictive 다lan 
that proposed by Kim , who imposes a monotonicity restriction on 
the likelihood ratio used to define the L-MLR order. Note that the 
set of L-RWFSD shifts includes the set of L-MLR shifts. These three 
shifts have the following relationships: F MLR ~F L-MLR G=:F 
L-RWFSD G. 
Figure 1 illustrates an example of a L-RWFSD shift and a caεe 
where a monotonicity restriction on the interval xε [Xj ,m) to obtain 
a L-MLR shift is not met (see below numerical example for a 
practical case). 
Numerical example: Consider the following two random variables 
with probability density functions j{x) and g(x) , respec디vely; η셔 = 1/2 
for - } 드X드 1 and g(x) = 2x+ 3 for - (3/2) 드X드 - (5/4), x + (7/4) for 
(5/4) 드x~ - (7/8) , - (3/5)x+ (7/20) for - (7/8)드X드 - (1 /4) , - (1/2)x + 
(3/8) for - (1 /4) 드X드 (3/4) ， where x) =- (3/2) , X2=- 1, x*=- (2/ 3), 
끼순: (1/4) X3=a/4X4= 1 ，낀 j(x)dx= 되(1 /2)dx = 1 and J컸) g~씨야X.= 
I ~~~/~:'(2x+3)dx+ I ~~/. ’ ((x+ (7/ 4)) dx + r - (1/4) ( - (3/ 5)x+ (7/20))dx+ I ~:.:“ ( -
(i‘때)X+ (3/8))dx:rlNote thatnx) anE$(X) cross at me point 써X; -
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(1 /4)). Hence. j(찌 and g(x) satisfY the fì이lowing conditions in 
Definition 3: 
(a) There exists a point m(= -(1/4))E[ • 1. (3/4)) such that fix) 드 g(x) 
for all xE[-1.- (1 /4)) and j(x) 2> g(x) for all xE[- (l /4).(3/4)] 
(b) When x*(=-(2/3))E[-1.- (1 /4)). one needs the following 
condi디on: 
fix) j l- (2/3)) 2 
---> --
g(x) g( - (2/3)) 3 
fix) j( -(2/3)) 2 
---> 二 ---
g(x) g( • (2/3)) 3 







In this section. we pro띠de a general compara디ve static statement 
concerning 야le L-R짜TFSD order. Using the general one-argument 
decision model. we follow the technique used in Landsberger and 
Meilijson (1 99이 잉ld Kim (1998) 
Theorem 
Suppose that αF and αc maximize E[u(z(x. 0'))] under F(x) and G(x). 
respec디vely. For all risk-averse decision makers. αF으 αc if 
(a) F L-R찌TFSD G 
(b) Zx는 O 밍ld Zax는 O. 
Proof. Given the CDFs F and G. each expected u디lity can be 
expressed as a function of the decision variable α 
EU서 α) 二J ;"u[z(x. O' )lfix)dx 
and 
EUc( α)= 짚3 u[z(x. O'))g(x)dx. 
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respectively. To prove αF> αc it is sufficient to show that. for a 
pair of values α1 and a2. 
if α2르 α1 and EUc( α2) 는EUc( α:). then EUF( α2) 는 EUp(al). (1) 
This is because (1) implies that ,ðF=EUF( ac}- EUp( 씨 for every a 드 
αc which in turn implies that the maximum of EU서 α) exists at a 
value of α larger than aC and tJ1US aF르 αc. Assuming that Llc 
EUc( α2) - EUc( αd >0 where α2>α1. we show that the following is 
non-negauve 
AF= JZr A ‘xlt1x)값 씨
 
( 
where A(x) = U[Z(X. α2)]- U[Z(X, ad]. Because Zax는 o by assump디on. 
the difference Z(X. α2) • z(x, ad is Ilon-decreasing in x. This implies 
that zx(χ α2) -Zx(X, αd is non-ne당a디ve. If the assumption Llc 二二
J:A(x)g(x)dx는 o is satisfied for the case where Z(X. α2) -Z(X. α d 르 O 
ι ‘ l 
for a11 x E: [X2 ,X3] , 야le assumption U' :;o, O implies that A는 o for a11 x뜨 
[X2 ,X3] and thus LlF는 O. If Z(X. α2) - Z(X, ad 드 o for a11 x드 [X2 ,X3 ], the 
assumption u'르 o implies that A 르 o for a11 XE [Xl.X3] and thus Llc <~ 
o which contradicts the assumptioIl Llc三 O. Therefore we exclude 
the case where Z(X, α2) -Z(X, αd 드 o for a11 XE(X2 ,X3]. 
Now consider the case that, with al , α2 and the payoff function 
Z given ‘ there exists a point x*( α1 ， α2.Z) ε [X2 ，X3] such that the 
difference Z(X, α2) - Z(X, ad is non-positive for a11 x르x* and non 
nega디ve for a11 x는x*. This implies that A 드 o for a11 x르x* and A 견 O 
for a11 x> X*. N ow we consider the fi이lowing two cases: 
Case (i): x* 드 m. 
Adding and subtrachng ftA(X)9(X)dx in me RHS of (2) pelds 
LlF= J때(씨m치 g(x) +g(x)]dx 
二 4G+ JtA{x)mx) g(x)ldx 
(3) 
Since j(지 二o for a11 xE [Xl ,X2), (3) Céffi be rewritten as 
LlF= Llc • J:,'A(x)g(x)dx + J~~ A(x)[(j{x) I g(x)) ._ l]g(x)dx 
+ iJ~'짜)lf{x) 一 g(x)]dx 十 E녀(xt/{.x)dx 
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Note that A(x) changes its sign from negative to posi디ve at x=x*. 
By the condition (b) in Definition 1, where j(x)/g(x) 드 1 for xE [x2.m). 
LlF르 Llc- f:'"A(x)g(x)dx+[ (ftx*)/g(앙)) - l)fx~ A(x)g(x)dx 
+J때(찌mx) -g(X)]dX+JXA(xm쩌dx (4) 
Since A(x) < 0 for 려1 xE [Xl.X2]. and A(x) > 0 뻐d (fIx) - g(x)] 는 o for all 
XE [m.x4]. (4) becomes 
LlF는 Llc+[(ftx*)/g(x*))-l]패A(xlfl찌& 
Since Llc 는 o by assump디on. -1 르 [(ftx*) / g(x*)) - 1] 르 o and Llc 는 
frA(X}g(X)dx we have 4F는 O 
Case (ii): m드x*. 
Let ’s rewrite (2) as 
LlF二 ftA{xmxldX + J￠A{xmxldX+ 갔A(xlflx)dx. (5) 
Integrating the first term in the RHS of (5) by parts yields 
LlF二Ak*)Rx*) - JZK/써F(x)dx+ J:"A(X)F(x)dx+ J강 A(xlfl셔dx (6) 
where A'(x) = u'[z(x. α2)]Zλ(x. (2'2) - u'[z(x. ad)zX(x. αd. Adding and sub-
rx. __ ，.~ .. _ rX;t 
tracting A(x*)G(x*) + 1 ~ A'(x)G(x)dx+.1 ~:A(x)g(x)dx in the RHS of (6) 
‘ ) XI ‘'X 
gives 
LlF二 A(x*)[F(x*) - G(x*)] + A(x*)G(x*) →JtA쩌[F(x) -G(，찌)dx 
f 2dx)G(x)dx+ I.혔써(fIx) -g(x)]dx+J햄(x)g(x)dx+J때(xlflx)dx 
By rearranging LlF. 
LlF= Llc + A(x*)[F(x*) - G(x*))- ζA찌[F(x) - G(x)]따 
+ f;A(X) (fIX) -g(x)]dx+ f:'4 A(xlflx)따 
(7) 
Note that z(x. α2) 르 z(x. αd when x드x*. and zx(x. α2)근 zxfx. α1) when x 
는Xl by the assump디on Zax는 O. The assumptions u'는 0 ， u"르 o and 
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Zx르 o imply that A'(x) 근 o for 머1 xE[xl.x*l. Since A 드 o for all x~x* 
and AzO for a lI x는x*. and the L-RWFSD condition implies that 
F(x) 드 G(x) for all xE{xl.x41 and j{x) 르g(x) for all xE {m.x3J. the 
assumption Llc 는 o implies that LlF'는 O. 
Q.E.D. 
Note that the L-MLR order implies the L-R찌까"SD order. Therefore. 
we obtain the following result derived by Kim (1 998). 
Corollary 
Suppose that αF 없ld ac maximize E[u(z(x. a))J under F(x) 없ld G(x). 
respectively. For all risk-averse decision makers. aF는 ac if 
(a) F L-MLR G 
(b) Zx므 o nd Zax는 O. 
Proof. From the property that the L-MLR shift implies the 
L-RWFSD shift and Theorem. the proof is completed. 
Theorem is a direct generalization of Corollary. The compara디ve 
statics statement made for an L-RWFSD change can also be applied 
for any L.MLR change "끼야lout any additional cost of assump디ons. 
IV. Concluding Remarks and Applications 
This paper introduces a new concept of the left-side relatively 
weak first-degree stochastic dominance order that extends the MLR 
order and the L-MLR order. Compared with the result in L-MLR 
shifts. the comparative statics result in Theorem includes a larger 
set of FSD changes. As a result. the L-R~π"SD order represents a 
net improvement over 야le L-MLR one without any cost of additional 
assumptions. 
We use the general decision moclel in this analysis and it 
includes a variety of economic decision problems. When we assume 
that the outcome variable is linear in the random variable. the 
simple form of z(x. a) may be expressed as z(x. α) 三 a(x-c) +zo 
where Zo and c are exogenous constants. As analyzed by Sandmo 
(1 971). Rothschilcl ancl Stiglitz (1 971). Fishbum and Porter (1 976). 
Dionne. E~eckhoudt. and Gollier (1 993a. 1993b) and l!:eckhoudt and 
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Gollier (1995) , the applications of this sirnple form of a decision 
rnodel are nurnerous: the standard portfolio problern , the problern 
of 야le cornpeti디ve firm with constant rnargin떠 cost under output 
price uncertainty, the coinsurance problern and others. 
In the standard portfolio model, the payoff function can be 
written as z(x, α)=zo+bWo(x-c) ， where b is the fraction of the 
initial wealth Wo allocated to the risky asset, x the randorn rate of 
retum of the risky asset and Zo 드 Wo( 1 + c) with c being the sure 
interest rate. This payoff function is equiv，떠ent to the simple form 
of z(x, Q') when Q' 三 bWo . For the compe디tive firm , the linear 
function is z(x, Q') = 이x- c) + zo, where x is the uncertain output 
price , c margin려 cost, - Zo the fIxed cost and α the output 1evel 
In the standard coinsurance problern , the payoff function is given 
by the final wealth z(x, α)=Wo-Àμ (1 - b)(x λμ) ， where x is the 
amount of random 10ss , μ the expected 10ss , b coinsurance rate , b 
Aμ the insurance premium , and Wo the initial wealth. This payoff 
function is equivalent to the simple form of z(x, α) when Zo 르 WO-
λμ ， α 三 -(1-b) and c 三 Aμ. If we limit the discussion to private 
insurance contracts , the coinsurance rate b belongs to the interval 
[0 ,1). Then , by definition , α is non-positive and belongs to the 
interval [- 1 ，이 Other ex밍nples of this sirnple form with 
appropriate modifications are included in Feder (1977) who 
examines 다le problern of hi디ng workers and in Paroush and 
Kahana (198이 who investigate the cooperative firm model. 
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